

# CASM: A Generalizable and Accessible Security Metric to Evaluate Security of Cache Architectures


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## Motivation

- Cache attacks are a threat
- Many secure cache architectures proposed to mitigate
- Difficult to compare designs security-wise
- Cache security metrics proposed but lack:
  - *Generalizability* – attack-independence, framework agnostic
  - *Accessibility* – security and non-security experts can reason about security

## Behavioral Observations of Cache Attacks

- Benign programs spread uniformly across sets<sup>[1]</sup> and ways
- Cache attack repeatedly re-accesses small number of sets/blocks



## Cache Access Security Metric (CASM)

- Indexing function should spread accesses uniformly across sets
  - Optimal performance + decouple index from cache access
- Compare empirical distribution of set accesses to uniform one

$$Ent_i(n) = \sum_{s \in S} i_u(s) \log_2 \frac{i_u(s)}{i_e(s)}$$

n: epoch  
s: cache set  
 $i_u$ : uniform prob.  
 $i_e$ : empirical prob. of accessing index

- Eviction policy should consider all blocks set as an equally likely candidate for eviction

$$Ent_e(n) = 1 - \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{w \in W_s} \frac{e_e(s) \log_2 e_e(s)}{\log_2(W_s)}$$


n: epoch  
s: cache set  
w: way  
 $W_s$ : associativity  
 $e_e$ : empirical prob. of evicting way

- Combine indexing and eviction entropy into single metric

$$CASM = \overline{Ent}_i + \overline{Ent}_e$$

## Findings

- Skewed associative<sup>[2]</sup> has best performance but worse security
- ScatterCache<sup>[3]</sup> provides better performance-security trade-off
- Mirage<sup>[4]</sup> provides slightly higher performance



[1] M. Hill and A. Smith, "Evaluating associativity in CPU caches," IEEE Transactions on Computers, 1989.  
[2] A. Seznec and F. Bodin, "Skewed-associative caches," PARLE '93 Parallel Architectures and Languages Europe, 1993.

[3] G. Saileshwar and M. Qureshi, "MIRAGE: Mitigating Conflict-Based Cache Attacks with a Practical Fully-Associative Design," USENIX Security Symposium, 2021.  
[4] M. Werner, T. Unterlugauer, L. Giner, M. Schwarz, D. Gruss, and S. Mangard, "ScatterCache: Thwarting Cache Attacks via Cache Set Randomization," USENIX Security Symposium, 2019.